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The economic fortunes of Scotland on the eve of the Union of 1707 were highly 
influenced by Scotland’s relationship with England. Armed conflicts, most notably the English 
Civil War and the Glorious Revolution had devastating effects on the Scottish population and 
economy. Farmers suffered greatly from the pillaging of soldiers while severe losses of 
manpower could potentially produce economic woes for an agrarian society like Scotland. The 
fields of farmers who were off fighting or dead would go untended, resulting in food shortages 
and, in the most extreme circumstances, famines. Meanwhile Scotland was lagging behind in the 
acquisition and development of colonial possessions.1 The eventful years before the Union saw 
Scotland directly confronting major challenges of economic development, including chronic 
deflation and English hegemony.  
Disregarding the 1603 Union of the Crowns, the English Navigation Acts of 1660 and 
1663 labeled Scotland a foreign country, thereby excluding Scottish ships from trade with the 
English colonies. However, trade records from between 1660 and 1707 show that the attempts to 
bar the Scots from the plantation trade were not always successful. In fact, trade between 
Scotland and the colonies generally increased throughout the second half of the 17th century 
despite the Navigation Acts. To England’s frustration, this legislation was often disregarded by 
many Scottish and Colonial merchants because both parties stood to benefit from this trade.2 
After the Union, the Navigation Acts were expanded to protect British shipping, rather than only 
English shipping. This post-Union expansion of the Navigation Acts was to eventually prove 
beneficial to Scotland.3    
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Nonetheless, the trade between the colonies and Scotland was not automatically 
profitable for Scotland as a whole. Wealthy Scottish landowners had fallen into the habit of 
purchasing luxury goods produced overseas; this led to a scarcity of financial capital, or deflation 
in Scotland as gold and silver were exported and foreign goods were imported. This trade deficit 
and the resulting shortage of capital were becoming increasingly troublesome for the economy of 
Scotland, causing the Parliament and economically minded Scots to seek a remedy for these 
problems. Far from being unique to Scotland, this economic trend reflected a common challenge 
among contemporary European countries at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. In 1681, the 
Scottish Parliament passed legislation designed to improve the manufacturing sector of the 
economy and reduce the trade deficit. A Proclamation for regulating and encouraging Trade and 
Manufactories in the Kingdom of Scotland preceded this legislation and succinctly described the 
economic situation of Scotland in 1681: 
…by the undue balance of trade, occasioned chiefly by the import of many unnecessary 
and superfluous commodities, consumed upon vanity and luxury, a great part of the stock 
of the money of the kingdom was exported, and the improvement of the native Export 
and Manufacture of the Kingdom neglected.4 
The subsequent legislation called for ship building materials to be duty free, a tax reduction on 
new stocks for manufactures in order to increase investments, and the removal of excise & 
customs taxes on dyes for the textile industry. Furthermore, the “Act for Encouraging Trade and 
Manufactures” sought to attract foreign investment and skills by offering legal protection to 
foreign entrepreneurs and citizenship to foreign Protestants who established manufactures in the 
country.5 The aim of this was to increase investments in the local textile industry and to import 
foreign innovations in order to make Scottish manufactures more competitive. 
However, there were still substantial economic obstacles ahead of a modernizing 
Scotland. Although foreign linen industries could threaten to out-compete the nascent Scottish 
industry, new protective tariffs had the adverse effect of causing foreign countries to close their 
markets to the Scots. At a time when the linen industry was the biggest source of employment 
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after agriculture and a third of Scotland’s exports were cloth, such tariff wars could be painful.6 
England was the biggest foreign market for the Scottish linen industry, so a tariff war could 
easily hurt the linen industry, but conversely the tariffs protected the Scottish linen industry from 
English competition. From 1681 and continuing beyond the Union of 1707, Scotland was 
consistently trying to improve this crucial industry by importing new techniques from the 
continent, particularly from the Dutch.7 Scotland’s other industries, notably coal, iron, fishing, 
and agriculture faced developmental challenges similar to those faced by the linen industry. 
There were three identifiable factors that contributed to the deflation facing Scotland. The 
first, mentioned previously, was the trade deficit under which Scotland had been operating. The 
remedy sought for the trade deficit was to limit imports and develop the local economy, 
particularly the textile industry, so that exports would increase. This action by the Scottish 
Parliament in 1681 led to a backlash from certain foreign markets, such as the English market for 
linen.8 The chosen solution to fix the trade deficit and therefore to indirectly fix the deflation 
problem caused a new problem: a deficiency of markets for Scottish goods. In a terrible twist of 
irony, the solution conceived by Scotland for opening new markets, the Darien Company, more 
formally known as the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies actually 
aggravated the deflation problem by tying up ₤400,000 in shares. The Darien Company became 
the second contributing factor to the deflation problem faced by Scotland.9 
The Bank of Scotland’s first governor, John Holland estimated the number of 
“adventurers” in the Darien Scheme to be 1,500.10 The amounts contributed ranged from the 
minimum of ₤100 to the maximum of ₤3,000 and came from titled men and untitled men from 
all parts of the country.11 The transfer of money from all over Scotland in exchange for stock in 
the Darien Company aggravated deflation because stock is not nearly as liquid as money and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Alastair	  J.	  Durie.	  The	  Scottish	  Linen	  Industry	  in	  the	  Eighteenth	  Century.	  (Edinburgh:	  John	  Donald	  Publishers	  LTD,	  
1979),	  13.	  	  
Hamilton,	  131.	  
7	  Durie,	  14.	  
8	  Durie,	  8.	  
9	  Hamilton,	  291,	  295.	  
10	  John	  Holland.	  A	  Short	  Discourse	  on	  the	  Present	  Temper	  of	  the	  Nation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Indian	  and	  African	  
Company;	  and	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  Scotland.	  Also,	  of	  Mr.	  Paterson’s	  pretended	  Fund	  of	  Credit.	  (Edinburgh:	  Printed	  by	  
John	  Reid,	  1696),	  10.	  
11	  A	  Perfect	  list	  of	  the	  several	  Persons	  Resident	  in	  Scotland	  who	  have	  subscribed	  as	  adventurers	  in	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  of	  
the	  Company	  of	  Scotland	  Trading	  to	  Africa	  and	  the	  Indies	  together	  with	  the	  respective	  sums	  which	  they	  have	  
severally	  subscribed	  in	  the	  books	  of	  the	  said	  company,	  amounting	  in	  the	  whole	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  ₤400,000	  sterling.	  
Edinburgh:	  printed	  and	  sold	  by	  the	  Heirs	  and	  successors	  of	  Andrew	  Anderson,	  1696.	  
	   304 
therefore does not circulate like money. Although the Darien Company did spend some of that 
money back into circulation, it did not spend it all in Scotland.  
The Company of Scotland was formed with the purpose of usurping the East India 
Company’s trade monopoly. It was originally going to be funded by both English and Scottish 
investors; ₤300,000 from each nation for a total of ₤600,000, until the English Parliament had the 
company relocate to Edinburgh and the burden of funding the endeavor (now only ₤400,000) 
was shifted entirely to Scotland.12 This move by the English was consistent with what Andrew 
Fletcher of Saltoun referred to as the “affair of Hamburgh,” in which a minister of King William 
III in Holland persuaded the Dutch against purchasing stock in the Darien Company.13 One of 
the early warning signs that may shed light on England’s decision to back out of the new trading 
company was a decline in the East India Company’s stock values when the new company 
formed.14 Independent of the exact reasons for England’s treatment of the Company of Scotland, 
the result was the same. The financial burden placed on Scotland for the formation of the 
company was increased but perhaps this was a contributing factor to the strong opinion in favor 
of the Darien Company in Scotland, since it made the company more exclusively Scottish.  
The blame for the failure of the Company of Scotland was attributed to King William and 
the English Parliament by many Scots.15 Their grievances against the English were not 
unfounded. William was in a predicament after the Glorious Revolution; he was the King of two 
independent parliaments who both had economic goals that could become contradictory. 
Furthermore, the ability of both the Scottish and the English Parliaments to pursue their own 
policies was increased because of compromises such as the abolition of the Lords of the Articles, 
a royal institution that had restricted the Scottish Parliament before the Glorious Revolution.16 
The English solution to the unwanted trading company was to refuse it aid until it collapsed.17 
This was despite a clause in the Darien Company’s charter on behalf of William III stating that 
“His Majestie’s officers Civil and Military, and all others, are hereby required in their respective 
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stations, to be Aiding and Assisting the said company.18” The reason given by William for 
neglecting the trading company was that it would “disturb the general peace of Christendom,19” 
but he was also known to have complained that “I have been ill-served in Scotland; but I hope 
some remedies may be found to prevent the inconveniences which may arise from this Act.20” It 
is true that the Darien Company could have “disturbed the general peace of Christendom,” 
because the location for the company’s new colony—the Gulf of Darien—was in territory 
previously claimed by Catholic Spain on the Isthmus of Panama. However, William’s reasoning 
here was quite hypocritical; William himself disturbed the peace of Christendom when he 
usurped the throne from James II and started a war. Additionally, a letter from Caledonia [the 
colony on the Gulf of Darien] to Boston dated 18 February 1698, referred to an attempt made by 
the Scots to contact the President of Spanish Panama for a peace bargain.21 As evidenced by the 
Spanish attack on the colony and its ultimate surrender to the Spanish, this professed peace deal 
came to nothing.22 
As previously mentioned, one of the primary reasons for the English attitude towards the 
Darien Company was a backlash from the East India Company and its patrons, although there 
were other reasons such as Captain Long’s “Letter from Jamaica, concerning the Scots settling in 
Caledonia, 1699.” Captain Long had expressed fears to the English Parliament about the impact 
that the settlement at Caledonia would have on the Jamaican colony. In particular, Long feared 
that a prosperous Scottish colony at Darien, especially if it were the result of a gold rush would 
lead to a labor shortage in Jamaica as men left to try their fortunes at Darien.23 Lieutenant 
Governor of Jamaica William Beeston reiterated this point.24   
However, the failure of the Darien Company cannot be attributed entirely to the English. 
When the legislation was passed to create the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the 
Indies, there was no reference to the Gulf of Darien or a plan to establish a colony in Spanish 
territory, so perhaps the founders of the company had not planned that far ahead. The company’s 
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charter forbade the inhabitation of an area by force; this however created a gray area because 
when the Scots settled at Darien, their immediate neighbors were not the Spaniards who had 
claimed the territory, but the Native Americans with whom the Scottish colonists had 
successfully established peace.25 Nonetheless, a backlash from Spanish colonial authorities was 
far from inconceivable. Fortunately the company’s charter did contain provisions permitting the 
colonists at Darien to make treaties and to defend themselves, their settlements and their trade.26 
The Company of Scotland was also burdened with other problems, although it can be argued that 
English aid could have helped resolve many of them. Provision shortages and illnesses, in 
addition to the immense length of time that it took to reinforce the expedition from Scotland, all 
proved to have severe consequences for the adventurers.27 
 The news of the Darien Company’s failure was not passively received in Scotland. 
Various writers began to circulate accounts of its failure and the reaction from William III was 
negative, as indicated by his edict against petitioning grievances for Darien and bounties for the 
capture of some pamphlet writers.28 In 1700, George Ridpath published “Scotland’s Grievances, 
Relating to Darien, &co. Humbly offered to the consideration of the Parliament” which began 
with a reference to an anecdote of William Wallace and Robert the Bruce with very nationalist 
overtones.29 The evocation of Scottish heroes from its medieval war for independence in the 14th 
century is just another indicator of the attitude that at least some Scots held at this time. 
Ridpath’s publication defined and explained how the English Parliament, acting in concert with 
King William III was treacherous to the Scots. Their treachery alienated the relationship between 
the Scottish subjects and their King by causing the King to act against the interest of his subjects 
in Scotland.30 Furthermore, the English Parliament did not consult the Council of Scotland and 
King William never consulted the Scottish Parliament before acting against the Darien 
Company.31 One of Ridpath’s chief protests against this “treachery” was that even if William’s 
actions had been for the greater good of his realm,  
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It will by no means acquit the pernicious counselors of treachery towards us, since the 
least they could have advised in this case was, that we should have had notice of such 
Proclamations before-hand, that we might have been upon our guard, and have done what 
we could to have prevented our colonies being frightened or starved from Darien.32 
Unfortunately Scottish grievances manifested themselves in more than just ink. In 
reaction to the East India Company’s seizure of the Scottish trading ship Annandale, the English 
trading vessel Worcester was apprehended by a Scottish crowd and three of its crew, including 
one Captain Green were hanged on the shores of Leith on the Firth of Forth.33 If we can trust 
these events as indicators of a strong public sentiment in favor of the Company of Scotland, 
which seems reasonable, then we can acknowledge a sort of economic nationalism occurring in 
Scotland at this time. This economic nationalism was centered on the Company of Scotland and 
its goal of establishing foreign markets for Scotland’s industries, in order to improve the fortunes 
of the nation. Subsequently, the failure and eventual dissolution of the Company of Scotland in 
1707 was an undeniable blow to this economic nationalism. 
Finally, the third factor contributing to the deflation problem was the reliance on precious 
metals to serve the function of money. The supply of financial capital at this time was vastly 
limited by the amount of precious metals in the country. The only traditional methods for 
ameliorating this predicament were to either fix the trade deficit, debase the currency, or to gain 
access to a new gold or silver mine. These solutions were generally making poor progress, so the 
Scottish Parliament with the aid of English financier John Holland, passed legislation to establish 
the Bank of Scotland on 17 July 1695. The shares for the new banking company, which was to 
have a twenty-one year monopoly in Scotland, were sold in London and Edinburgh.34 The 
founding of the Bank of Scotland in 1695 followed very quickly after the establishment of the 
Bank of England in 1694 and the general principles of both were “to be employed in the trade of 
lending and borrowing money upon interest and in no other.35” 
The new banking innovations—a national bank issuing notes of credit—were regulated 
by the government so that people would have a greater trust in the banks & their notes while also 
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being protected from the “oppressive extortion” of goldsmiths and other private lenders.36 The 
Bank of England accelerated this process by replacing the old tally stick system with their notes 
and ascribing a common seal to their notes in order to improve their circulation.37 The 
development of a central bank, regulated by the government and initially funded via the sale of 
stocks to private investors who would then make money from the interest paid on bank loans, 
played a critical role in solving the deflation problem by circulating paper notes representing 
gold or silver alongside gold and silver.  
The more Credit the Bank has, and the more Money is lodged in it, the more it will lessen 
interest, for want of Occasions to improve it; and those who Lodge their Money in the 
Bank have it as much at their disposal as if it were in the hands of the Goldsmiths, or in 
their own Cash-Chest, and there is a greater Value than the Money which is deposited in 
the Bank, that circulates by their Credit as much as if it were stirring in Specie: And the 
Bank Bills serve already for Returns and Exchange to and from the remotest parts of the 
Kingdom, and will in a little time do the like in Foreign Parts, which will lessen the 
exporting of Bullion for the paying and maintaining our Armies abroad during this War; 
and if the Bulk of the Money of the Nation which has been Lodged with the Goldsmiths, 
had been deposited in the Bank 4 or 5 years past, it had prevented its being so 
Scandalously Clipped…38 
Eventually the amount of money circulating in note form exceeded the actual amount of precious 
metals held at the banks. Due to its relationship with Parliament, the Bank of England, whose 
example was closely followed by the Bank of Scotland, was also advertised as being a more 
secure place to keep one’s savings than in the vaults of independent goldsmiths or an 
unrestrained corporation.39 This, alongside the 1707 recoinage, helped to increase deposits at the 
bank, thereby increasing the amount of money available to be lent out and subsequently 
decreasing the interest charged on loans by making them less risky for the bank since more 
borrowers meant more interest being paid back to the bank. This banking innovation solved the 
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37	  John	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  Godfrey.	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  short	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39	  Godfrey.	  “A	  short	  account	  of	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  Bank	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  England,”	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deflation problem via artificially inflating the supply of gold & silver in the economy by 
increasing the amount of credit in circulation in the form of paper notes.40 The Bank of Scotland 
was given permission to raise £120,000 Scots from £10,000 sterling by way of issuing credit.41 
Contemporary London merchant John Broughton lamented these new innovations for a 
handful of reasons, including the obvious potential for corruption because bank members were 
simultaneously allowed to sit in Parliament.42 He was suspicious of the strong efforts to prolong 
the existence of the Bank of England since it was originally formed under the conditions of 
wartime necessity.43 Broughton was also strongly critical of the ability of the bank to lend money 
to the government at interest due to the immense power that comes with being the creditor of a 
country’s government.44 Adding to the new bank’s profitability was its ability to also lend money 
and issue notes to the rest of England at interest.45 Broughton feared “that all these consequences 
are chargeable upon that boundless Power which the Bank has of extending a Credit so current as 
this is, which, in its Nature, will always be increasing, until it grows too great for all 
opposition.46” However, despite these drawbacks, the Bank of England and the Bank of 
Scotland47 still served their primary purpose of remedying deflation:  
The Power to extend their Credit, and upon so good a Foundation as the security of an 
Act of Parliament, is perhaps a more considerable Article of their Profit than even so 
great an Interest. They had a sufficient Prospect (and Time has made it good) of raising 
their Credit to a Par with Money; and wherever such Credit obtains, it affords all the real 
Advantages of so much Money. And a Credit thus Establish’d, and rais’d to Par with 
Money, is capable of being increas’d to an immense Value; considering the great 
Occasions for it, and Conveniences of it in Trade, which, its known, cannot be carry’d on 
to a due Extent in England, without a far greater Sum in Credit, than there is in Specie in 
the whole Nation: And therefore a Credit vastly extended, must bring in Vast Profits to 
them that are thus Credited.48 
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Not every contemporary of Broughton shared his sense of alarm and skepticism with the power 
being given to the Bank of England and, to a lesser degree, the Bank of Scotland. A brief account 
of the intended Bank of England by William Paterson discussed some different consequences of 
the central bank.  
…when this War [the Glorious Revolution & subsequent war with France] begun, the 
Credit of the Nation was low, and the Wits on both sides, found no better nor honester 
way to supply the Necessities of the Government, than by enhauncing the Price and 
Interest of Money; the effect of which was, that the Government was obliged to pay from 
double to treble, or higher interest: The Disease [debt] growing daily worse, Men were 
tempted to draw their Effects from Trade and Improvements, and found the best and 
securest Gain, in making Merchandise of the Government and Nation.49 
The belief espoused here by Paterson was that the growing debt would lead to economic 
improvements and advancements, which is in accordance with the consistently growing national 
debt of Great Britain during the 18th century. Despite the economic growth of the 18th century, 
the national debt and consequently the taxes of Great Britain steadily rose.50  
 Other consequences of the new banking institution revealed themselves during the panics 
surrounding various Jacobite Risings. Jacobite scares usually led to bank runs, such as that seen 
in 1715, but the banks did not have enough coinage to convert everybody’s paper notes. This 
situation led to the establishment of interest-bearing accounts. When banks went insolvent 
because a Jacobite scare caused a bank run, those left with bank notes were promised interest. 
Eventually this practice came to be used during stable banking periods as well. 
 Historian Henry Hamilton wisely remarked that capital and skill were the two ingredients 
holding back most sectors of the Scottish economy on the eve of the Union, but between new 
banking innovations initiated in the 1690s and the gradual development of domestic industries, 
economic growth in Scotland was indeed a reality before the Union and, less surprisingly, after 
the Union.51 Yet domestic growth cannot always occur in a bubble and in this instance it was 
subjected to many factors. The available supply of financial capital, the availability of markets, 
competition for burgeoning markets and the threat of war, present in this case by the looming 
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succession crisis of Queen Anne’s reign, combined to create a fragile atmosphere for the 
continuation of economic growth. Although it cannot be known how Scotland would have 
developed economically if the Union never happened, it is clear that the initiative for economic 
improvement happened domestically and was underway before the Union. Nonetheless, the 
Union was still a catalyst for economic growth because new markets became available for 
Scottish goods, the Union bolstered the prospects of stability and peace by resolving the 
succession crisis, and payment of the “equivalent” by the English in return for the dissolution of 
the Darien Company provided a helpful boost of financial capital to the Scottish economy.52 The 
growth of economic nationalism in Scotland during the 1690s may have taken a blow when the 
Darien Company failed, but Scottish efforts to improve economically did not. Ultimately the 
Union proved beneficial to Scotland, but the impetus for Scottish modernization came from 
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